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 Foreword 
This study is mainly based on a more comprehensive study on debt swaps for which the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) commis-
sioned the German Development Institute (DIE). One of the aims of the study was to ana-
lyze the instrument of debt swaps and to look into whether there may be a need to reform, 
viz. to flexibilize, the modalities defined for this instrument by the German government. 
Studies were conducted for the purpose in three countries (Indonesia, Jordan, Peru1), al-
though the aim of these country studies2 was not to present a comprehensive evaluation of 
debt swaps but to provide a picture of the actual implementation of the debt swaps under 
consideration. 
In preparing the study a good number of expert interministerial interviews were conducted 
at home and abroad; their findings have likewise gone into the making of the study. The 
author wishes to take the present opportunity to thank all of her interview partners for their 
willingness to engage in highly informative discussions with her. 
The overall research project was supported with funds from the BMZ. The author is solely 
responsible for the assessments and recommendations made in the present study. 
                                                 
1 The country analysis for Peru was carried out by Stefan Hochhuth. The present study refers to this 
analysis, pointing to it in many places dealing with Peru’s experiences. For an in-depth examination of 
the case of Peru, see Hochhuth (2006). 
2 The country studies included an 8–10-day stay in the countries concerned which was not used to evalu-
ate the individual projects. 
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Summary 
The present analysis of German debt-conversion efforts indicated that debt swaps consti-
tute a meaningful instrument of development policy. The study for this reason recom-
mends that the use of the instruments should be further expanded and flexibilized. In view 
of the fact that the Paris Club rules on debt swaps are substantially more flexible than 
those set by the German government, the study recommends that the German rules be 
adapted to those of the Paris Club. 
Instead of being used globally, though, debt swaps should be restricted to cases in which 
the debts concerned are unsustainable, it is possible to ensure that the funds involved will 
be used in ways that benefit development, and the country concerned consents to their use. 
Advantages of the German debt-swap instrument 
In particular, the German instrument of FC debt swaps offers the following advantages: 
• Increased development leverage: Debt swaps provide the German government addi-
tional development leverage in its policy dialogue with recipient governments. 
• Debt reduction: Debt swaps reduce levels of indebtedness. While in Jordan the in-
strument contributed substantially to reaching debt sustainability, the debt-reduction 
effect was low in Indonesia and Peru because the volume of the debt swaps carried 
out there was relatively low. 
• Simplified administrative procedure: One particular feature of the German debt-
swap instrument is the simplified administrative procedure it uses to select and carry 
out projects. One good indication of this is the fact that Germany has implemented far 
more debt swaps than the other members of the Paris Club. 
• Additionality: Debt swaps make it possible for partner governments to carry out ad-
ditional development measures that they would presumably not have carried out, or at 
least not on the present scale, without the funds made available by a debt swap. It 
should, though, be noted here that for methodological reasons it is generally difficult 
to demonstrate additionality by empirical means. 
• Catalyst effect: A successfully implemented debt swap may have a catalyst effect on 
other donors. This could well be the case in Indonesia, where Germany was the first 
donor to implement a debt swap and other donors could follow the positive German 
example if it turns out to be successful. 
• Conditioned debt relief: In all three countries under consideration here, debt swaps 
were based on conditionalities and a measure of control not so extensive as to overly 
restrict the partners in their own responsibility. 
• Creation / increase of ownership: The projects involved are proposed by the partner 
countries, and since these projects are transacted via national budgets, they are ele-
ments of partner systems. In addition, this approach serves to signal to partner coun-
tries that their structures are recognized. 
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• Inclusion of civil society: Civil society can be involved in the implementation of debt 
swaps. One example of such involvement would be the counterpart fund in Peru. 
• Integration into German or multilateral DC structures: The partner-country proj-
ects carried out in the framework of debt swaps may be seen as especially well inte-
grated into German DC structures if these projects are implemented either along with 
or following German FC programs and/or TC programs. It would likewise be recom-
mendable to integrate them into multilateral structures. This could well serve to pro-
mote a donor harmonization of the kind called for in the Paris Declaration. 
Problems involved with the German debt-swap instrument 
The advantages outlined above must, however, be weighed off against the following prob-
lems involved in German debt swaps: 
• Fiduciary risks and corruption: In view of the fact that the projects bound up with 
debt swaps are carried out autonomously by the partner countries concerned and the 
uses to which the funds for these projects are put are less intensively monitored and 
controlled than the funds involved in other FC instruments used by the Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau (KfW), we can speak of a fiduciary risk and a corruption risk. 
• Major strain on partner budgets: The high shares of partner funds required German 
debt swaps mean that partner countries have to make advance outlays in national cur-
rency and may thus be forced to seek loans in local currency, which may be more 
costly than FC loans. 
• Windfall effect: There is a risk that partner countries may not make any additional 
funds available for projects conducted in connection with debt swaps. However, for 
methodological reasons, it is difficult to prove additionality by empirical means. 
• Poor monitoring, coordination, and documentation: Other problems encountered 
in Peru included the fact that there is no clear-cut monitoring of the debt-swap pro-
gram, the projects are not networked, the relevant documentation is poorly organized, 
and no official information work is done. 
• Rapid disbursement: Another problem encountered in Peru was the speed with 
which the funds were disbursed. In this case the partner country has less incentive to 
make efficient use of the funds involved because it is not obliged to repay them. 
Inflexible instrument used with a limited group of countries 
The manner in which the modalities for German debt swaps are formulated gives rise to 
the following problems. And in particular, the group of eligible countries is severely re-
stricted for the reasons named below: 
• HIPCs: In connection with the HIPC Initiative these countries are eligible for 100 % 
FC debt cancellation, and for this reason they are no longer in need of debt swaps. 
Debt Swaps 
German Development Institute 3 
• LDCs: The KfW in any case provides countries with LDC status grants only, not 
loans. 
• Middle-income countries: Since the only debts eligible for FC debt swaps are those 
that have already been restructured, with a high degree of concessionality, in the Paris 
Club framework, debt swaps are often not an attractive solution for highly indebted 
middle-income countries (LMICs and MICs). These countries tend to prefer new re-
structuring in the Paris Club framework. 
Flexibility of the rules for debt swaps applied by the Paris Club 
As far as the following points are concerned, the Paris Club’s rules for debt swaps are far 
more flexible than those used by the German government: 
• Debt types: Under the Paris Club rules all ODA debts are eligible for debt swaps. In 
Germany, on the other hand, only restructured ODA debt is eligible. 
• Debt-swap types: The Paris Club rules allow for debt swaps other than debt-for-aid 
or debt-for-nature swaps, including e.g. debt-for-equity swaps. 
• Sectors: The Paris Club imposes no rules on its members concerning the sectors eli-
gible for debt swaps. 
• Uses to which debt swaps are put: The Paris Club makes no stipulations on how 
debt swaps are used (projects, programs, basket-financing, or budget-financing). 
Recommendations 
In view of the problems outlined above, the present study comes to the following recom-
mendations: In order to minimize the fiduciary risk, an internationally recognized auditor 
should, as provided for in any case, examine debt-swap projects on the basis of a final 
report. Annual partner reports are often not a sufficient basis for an assessment of the im-
plementation of debt swaps, since these reports do not contain an objective analysis. 
Improved donor coordination could provide better leverage. In Peru, for example, there 
was very little coordination of measures among donors. One goal of the Swiss debt-
reduction program was to integrate other donors. The program’s aim was to achieve sig-
nificant levels of debt reduction. This is one reason why Switzerland participated in a 
number of internationally coordinated actions, including e.g. debt-buyback initiatives, 
which, according to the World Bank, could become increasingly important in the future. 
Furthermore, the enhanced multilateral monitoring and investment instruments now avail-
able make it possible for donors to coordinate their contributions. More policy-based lend-
ing could be used in this connection. 
Generally speaking, flexibilizing, and in this way expanding, the quantitative outreach of 
the debt-swap instrument would provide German DC with better avenues to improving its 
participation in and gaining more influence and policy space for its efforts to contribute to 
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reaching the MDGs. In all three of the countries under consideration the funds mobilized 
through debt swaps for the most part contributed directly to reaching individual MDGs, 
and these funds were in part well integrated within multilateral development strategies. 
However, the contribution provided by German DC on the basis of debt swaps has been 
relatively small. In other words, while debt-swap projects may support partners in their 
efforts to reach the MDGs, the question is whether this type of project-financing provides 
better support for reaching the MDGs than use of the funds for the FC instruments offered 
by the KfW. Moreover, creating linkages between internationally coordinated debt 
swaps could prove to be a good way to provide a significant contribution to reaching the 
MDGs. 
Debt swaps would be more attractive for some partner countries if German debt swaps 
were handled more flexibly, i.e. if they were brought more into line with the Paris Club 
rules and modified in the following ways: 
• Adaptation to the Paris Club rules: Under the Paris Club rules debt swaps can gen-
erally be made available for all ODA debts. For Germany, this would serve to sub-
stantially enlarge the group of countries eligible for debt swaps. 
• Inclusion of commercial claims: Under the Paris Club rules debt swaps can also be 
used for commercial claims, a practice that has been adopted e.g. by the UK, France, 
Italy, and Spain. While debt swaps for commercial claims are also permissible under 
German budget law, they are not approved under the German rules for debt swaps. 
This means that the use of debt swaps is restricted in Germany. 
• Enlarged scopes to make use of the funds involved: Under the German rules a 
debtor country’s counterpart or local funds can be used only for projects in certain 
sectors, these funds are not allowed to be transferred directly to a partner country’s 
budget. Compared with the use of debt swaps for projects, budget-financing has the 
following advantages, which are similar to those offered by budget support: better 
donor coordination, increased ownership, reduced transaction costs, uniform budget 
frameworks, financing of current costs, and improvement of the policy dialogue. 
Budget-financing may, though, force donors to relinquish some of their own influence 
and leeway. 
However, if these advantages of budget-financing are to be turned to account, the follow-
ing requisite conditions must be given: functioning budgeting practices, effective plan-
ning and implementing structures, and satisfactory public budget management.  
• Expansion of the number of sectors eligible: Projects conducted in the framework 
of German debt swaps are restricted to two sectors – environment, education – as well 
as to the broader field of poverty reduction. An expansion of sectors eligible is rec-
ommended. 
For debt swaps the following requisite conditions should either be created or observed: 
• Requisite structural conditions: One possible way to secure project quality is to 
integrate debt swaps into existing DC structures of German or other bi- or multi-
lateral donors. 
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• Better integration of debt swaps into national strategies and more comprehensive 
approaches to poverty-reduction strategies could contribute to the sustainability of the 
projects and programs involved. 
• Good budget management is a key condition required to ensure that the funds con-
cerned are put to the uses agreed upon. 
On the whole, it can be noted here that there is a need for reform leading to an adaptation 
of the current German rules to the more flexible rules used by the Paris Club. 
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1 The role of debt swaps for developing countries 
The aim of the present study is to analyze the instrument of financial cooperation (FC) 
debt conversion (debt swaps)1 and to examine whether there may be a need for reform in 
the direction of flexibilizing the instrument. For this purpose exemplary studies were con-
ducted in three different countries (Indonesia, Jordan, Peru2). Even though these country 
studies do not contain any comprehensive evaluations of debt swaps, they do provide a 
good picture of the actual implementation of the debt swaps in question. 
In essence, the instrument of FC debt swaps is used to pursue two goals: On the one hand 
to grant debt relief to highly indebted countries; on the other hand to steer available scopes 
for debt relief toward development-related uses. This gives donor countries the possibility 
to enlarge their development-related leverage in their dialogue with recipient countries. 
Since the 1950s credits have been restructured or cancelled at regular intervals. However, 
this has seldom succeeded in breaking the vicious circle of debt restructuring and debt 
relief, new borrowing and insolvency. 
In the past ten years multi- and bilateral donors have implemented a number of systematic 
debt-relief initiatives for low-income countries (LICs). These include in particular the 
Heavily Poor Countries (HIPC)-Initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative.3 Both 
initiatives have made debt swaps unnecessary for LICs. In addition, many countries have 
now been given least-developed country (LDC) status, which means that the funds they 
receive from the (KfW) are grants, not credits. 
For lower-middle-income countries (LMICs), on the other hand, there has been no sys-
tematic debt relief initiative, and ad hoc mechanisms have been used instead. The only 
avenue open to LMICs is thus to reach agreement with their creditors, in the Paris Club 
framework, on debt reduction or restructuring or debt swaps. This lack of systematic ap-
proaches to debt relief or debt restructuring makes debt swaps an important option for 
LMICs to reduce their debt burden. 
                                                 
1 In the framework of debt swaps, part of the existing FC debt of the countries involved are cancelled 
subject to the provision that the country concerned uses a certain sum of local currency (20–50 % of the 
amount cancelled) for projects agreed on for the purpose. 
2 Stefan Hochhuth conducted the Peru country analysis to which the present study refers, pointing to it in 
many places dealing with Peru’s experiences. For an in-depth look at the case of Peru, see Hochhuth 
(2006). 
3 According to the World Bank’s definition, LICs are countries with a per capita income below US$ 825, 
while LMICs are countries with per capita incomes ranging between US$ 826 and 3255. 
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When it comes to reaching debt sustainability4, LMICs have far fewer options than LICs, 
even though some LMICs have per capita incomes in part only marginally higher than 
those of many LICs (Figure 1). 
In fact, some HIPCs, including e.g. Honduras, Guyana, or Bolivia, are classified not as 
LICs but as LMICs.5 Like the HIPCs, some LMICs are also highly indebted (Figure 2). 
                                                 
4 We speak of external debt sustainability when a country is able to service its current and future debt 
without impairing its economic growth and without needing to restructure its debt (IMF / IDA 2001, 4). 
However, this definition does not take domestic debt into account, and this means that the definition 
does not include fiscal debt sustainability. Nor does it give consideration to whether or not public funds 
are used for appropriate development measures. But this IMF definition does provide the groundwork 
for a relatively objective, simple, and thus operationalizable application. 
5 A country is eligible for the HIPC Initiative if it has IDA-only status and has received a loan in the  
framework of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). As of July 1, 2006, the cut-off point 
for IDA-only status has been a per capita income of US$ 1025, i.e. a level above the limit of US$ 825 
for LICs (IMF / IDA 2006; IMF 2005). However, between 1998 and 2005, when the HIPCs qualified, 
the cut-off point for the IDA-only Facility was lower than US$ 1025. Nevertheless, some LMICs that 
were once categorized as HIPCs are granted multilateral debt relief, while other LMICs that have not 
been classed as HIPCs are ineligible for it. To qualify for the multilateral debt-relief initiative, countries 
that have not participated in the HIPC Initiative must have a per capita income below US$ 380 (IWF 
2006). 
Figure 1: Per capita incomes of the poorest LMICs, in US$, 2004 
 
Source: World Bank 2006a 
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But the question now is: Under what circumstances should a country be eligible to partici-
pate in debt swaps, and thus to have its debt reduced? Generally speaking, debt relief is 
one approach to providing financial resources to poor countries. An alternative avenue is 
to provide more grants in relation to credits or to alter the degree of credit concessionality. 
Debt relief is generally used to pursue three important goals (IMF 2002a, 3): 
1. To reach long-term debt sustainability: The aim of debt relief is to contribute to 
reaching long-term debt sustainability and to enable the countries concerned to avoid 
debt traps. 
2. To support the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): Both debt sustainability 
and the MDGs can be reached with the aid of comprehensive debt relief; on their own 
many developing countries are unable to generate the financial resources they need to 
reach the MDGs. 
3. Mitigation of exogenous shocks: One aim of debt relief is to mitigate the negative 
impacts of exogenous shocks, which often impair the affected countries’ ability to 
pay. 
 
 
Figure 2: Total LMIC debt in % of exports, 2004 
 
Source: World Bank 2006b 
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As important as these goals are, they have to be reached under the constraint of scarce 
financial resources. However, debt relief at the same time also involves a number of prob-
lems (IMF 2005a): 
• Distortion of resource allocation: The financial resources made available for debt 
relief are no longer available for other development measures. 
• Orientation to past debt: The crucial criterion for debt relief is past debt, which may 
be due to poor (economic) policies and institutions; a country’s present debt level or 
its debt-service record is used as a criterion for high indebtedness. 
• Moral-hazard behaviors: Debt reduction may encourage expectations of future debt 
relief and thus create an incentive for moral-hazard behaviors on the part of debtor 
countries. This would prevent the development of a credit culture. On the one hand, 
since, at least in tendency, countries with relatively poor economic policies and insti-
tutions are rewarded by debt relief, these countries are given little incentive to im-
prove their economic policies. On the other hand, countries with relatively good eco-
nomic policies and institutions are placed at a disadvantage. Furthermore, there are a 
number of arguments that can be advanced for the provision of loans; the latter are 
based on contracts that are generally binding in nature. In addition, loans – as opposed 
to grants or debt reduction – provide an incentive to improve debt management, and 
this is one good way for the countries concerned to regain access to the international 
financial market. 
• Loss of creditworthiness: Granting debt relief entails the risk that – in particular – 
LMICs may lose both a measure of their creditworthiness and, at least temporarily, 
even access to the international capital markets. 
Even though debt reduction does have its drawbacks, without some form of debt relief 
many LICs or LMICs have, in the long term, no chance of reaching debt sustainability. 
Since there are no systematic approaches available for debt relief for highly indebted 
LMICs, we can speak here of an instrument gap. Debt swaps could help to close this gap. 
However, the instrument of debt swaps should be used only if the following conditions are 
given: 
• High level of indebtedness: One important precondition for the provision of debt 
swaps is that the country concerned has external debt that is no longer sustainable. 
• The funds involved are used for development-related purposes: On its own, debt 
reduction does little more than address the symptoms, but without removing the 
causes, of underdevelopment. This is why economic reforms and/or a meaningful de-
velopment-related use of at least part of the funds concerned constitute an important 
condition for a debt relief geared to paving a heavily indebted country’s way back to 
long-term solvency. 
• Consent of the country concerned: The country concerned should be required to 
declare its consent to a debt swap. 
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2 Rules and modalities for debt swaps 
2.1 The Paris Club’s rules and modalities for debt swaps 
Under the rules currently in effect for the Paris Club all official development assistance 
(ODA) debt is eligible for debt swaps, the reason being that there is consensus among 
creditors that they are free to achieve more generous terms on ODA debt. This means that 
when it comes to decisions on ODA the creditors have a broad spectrum of options avail-
able to them, ranging from different degrees of concessionality to provision of outright 
grants. Within this framework debt swaps tend to be closer to grants, because debt swaps 
as a rule involve provision of debt relief (Figure 3). However, there are upper limits for 
debt swaps for non-ODA debt, such as trade credits. 
Distinctions are drawn here between different debt-swap types (Paris Club 2006a and 
2006b; Fayolle 2006): 
• Debt for aid or debt for nature: This option involves swapping FC-related claims 
directly for DC or environmental projects, which are then funded in local currency. 
One other option is for a creditor to sell his claims to a third party (e.g. a nongovern-
mental organization – NGO or a local institution), often at a discount, with this third 
party then investing in DC programs or in the environmental sector. 
• Debt for equity: Here a distinction is made between a direct swap of debt for assets 
for the investor, with the latter purchasing local assets with local currency, and an in-
Figure 3: ODA modalities, measured in terms of their degree of concessionality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Grants 
Credits 
Debt Swaps
Low degree of  
concessionality 
High degree of  
concessionality 
Kathrin Berensmann 
 German Development Institute 12 
direct swap of debt for assets for the investor, with the creditor selling local currency 
to an investor (third party), and the investor purchasing assets with local currency. 
• Debt for exports: Under this arrangement creditors’ claims are met either directly, 
with local goods, i.e. with exports from the developing country concerned, or a credi-
tor may sell his local currency to third parties, who then use it to purchase local 
goods. 
While all ODA debts are eligible for debt swaps, non-ODA debt, e.g. claims stemming 
from trade credits, are subject to the following restrictions (Paris Club 2005): 
• As a rule, low-income countries are permitted to convert 20 % – and in exceptional 
cases up to 30 % – of their non-ODA debt within the debt-swap framework. Such 
countries also have the alternative to opt for a sum of 15–20 million special drawing 
rights (SDRs). 
• As a rule, middle-income countries are permitted to convert 10 % – and in exception 
cases up to 30 % – of their non-ODA debt within the debt-swap framework. 
• There are nominal ceilings in effect for creditors holding small amounts of debt. One 
alternative for them is to opt for 15–30 million SDRs. 
These upper limits are designed to ensure that creditors are able to maintain their claims 
and that all creditors accord equal treatment to their debtors. They also serve to minimize 
moral-hazard behaviors on the part of debtors and to safeguard solidarity among creditors. 
As a means of ensuring a high level of inter-creditor transparency, both creditors and deb-
tors are required to report regularly to the Paris Club on transactions conducted in the  
framework of debt-swap operations. 
One further characteristic of the Paris Club rules and modalities for debt swaps is that 
they include the following types (mechanisms) of debt conversion: 
• Both short- and long-term debt is eligible for debt swaps. 
• Debt swaps may remain in step with the original repayment schedule. This means that 
the debts concerned are cancelled within the period stipulated in the original debt-
restructuring agreements reached in the Paris Club framework, i.e. the arrangement 
applies for the annuities agreed upon. In this case the debt-reduction effect makes it-
self felt only when these annuities fall due. For this reason a debt swap of this kind 
has tangible effects for both creditor and debtor only when the annuities fall due. 
However, since in this case the debt reduction applies to the debtor’s nominal debt, 
the latter declines in consequence.  
The Paris Club also permits its members to decide on the sectors in which they wish to use 
their debt swaps and how they wish to use the funds involved (projects, programs, basket-
funding, or budget-financing). 
Between January 2004 and October 2005 the following types of debt swaps were carried 
out in the Paris Club; they had a total volume of EUR 404 million (Figure 4). 
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Most of these transactions were debt-for-aid or debt-for-nature swaps, amounting to a total 
of US$ 302 million (Figure 5). Debt-for-aid and debt-for-nature swaps accounted for 
roughly 75 % of all debt swap transacted; debt-for-equity swaps accounted for a good 
19 %; and other debt swaps amounted to a total figure of roughly 6 %. 
Figure 4: Debt swaps transacted in the Paris Club from 1/2004 to 10/2005, in US$ million 
 
Source: Based on data published by the Paris Club (2005) 
Figure 5: Percentages of creditors involved in debt-for-aid or debt-for-nature swaps 
 
Source: Based on data published by the Paris Club (2005) 
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Between January 2004 and October 2005 the percentages of creditors opting for debt-for-
aid or debt-for-nature swaps (amounting to a total of US$ 302) were quite unevenly dis-
tributed. Germany took the lead here, carrying out a total of 62 % of these swaps; it was 
followed by Italy (19 %), the US (12 %), Spain (4 %), and Norway (2 %). 
2.2 The rules and modalities for debt swaps in Germany 
In the framework of German debt swaps, Germany cancels a share of the existing FC 
debts of countries that have concluded debt-restructuring agreements with the Paris Club, 
provided that the country concerned uses a certain sum of local currency (20–50 % of the 
amount of debt cancelled) for projects on which agreement has been reached. Accord-
ingly, the German government is authorized to convert restructured FC debt, and eligible 
countries are required to meet the following criteria: 
• Per capita income below US$ 3,035/ 2003: This limit is oriented to the annual ad-
justment of the eligibility limits undertaken in keeping with the World Bank’s defini-
tion lower-middle-income countries (LMICs). 
• A previous restructuring agreement in the Paris Club framework is necessary that 
contains what is known as the swap option. In other words, the funds eligible for debt 
swaps must previously have been restructured with the Paris Club. 
• Another condition for a debt swap is that the debtor countries concerned continue to 
meet the terms of existing debt-restructuring agreements. 
The main precondition for a debt swap of this kind is that the debtor country makes avail-
able local currency funds amounting to 20–50 % of the sum of the FC debt swap (debt 
cancelled). The share of local currency funds required is specified on a case-by-case basis, 
with the ministries involved reaching agreement on the percentage of these local currency 
funds. The orientation variable used for the purpose is the debt-relief effect, determined on 
the basis of net present value. Poorest countries that have restructured their debt with the 
Paris Club under the Naples terms, which provide for cancellation of 67 % of commercial 
claims, are assigned a local currency funds share of 20 %. 
Two sectors are eligible for the use of these local currency funds – environmental and 
resource protection and education as well as, in addition, general poverty-reduction meas-
ures. 
In institutional terms, the measures involved should be integrated into either concrete bi- 
or multilateral projects in need of local currency funds or measures conducted by a gov-
ernment or an NGO. 
Debt swaps are supposed to lead to additional measures (additionality), i.e. the local cur-
rency funds involved are expected to be used for new projects. Ongoing projects are eligi-
ble for support only if their funding is jeopardized, and recipient countries are required to 
furnish proof of this. 
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Comparison of German and Paris Club rules 
We find here that the Paris Club rules on debt swaps are considerably more flexible than 
those used by the German government. This goes in particular for the fact that under the 
Paris Club rules all ODA debts are eligible for debt swaps. In Germany, by comparison, 
only restructured ODA debts are eligible for debt swaps. In addition, the Paris Club rules 
also provide for models other than debt for aid or debt for nature – e.g. debt-for-equity 
swaps. 
Moreover, the Paris Club imposes no rules on its members regarding the volume of both 
swaps and the local currency funds to be raised. The share of local currency funds pro-
vided for can play a significant role in debt-swap negotiations and may at the same time 
serve as an important bargaining issue when it comes to talks on e.g. interest rates, re-
demption-free periods, etc. A high share of local currency funds offers the advantage that 
in this case the donor has greater influence on how these funds are used. One disadvantage 
of a high share of local currency funds must be seen in the lower debt-reduction effect that 
this entails. 
2.3 German debt swaps in Indonesia, Jordan, and Peru 
Measured in terms of its quantitative volume, the instrument of the debt swap plays a ra-
ther insignificant role in German FC. While up to EUR 100 million p.a. is available for 
debt swaps, total FC-related debt amounted to EUR 16.385 billion at the end of 2005. 
Box 1: Administrative procedure 
The official administrative procedure is as follows. The BMZ applies the following criteria to 
select countries and to define the volume of a debt swap. Relative urgency of the recipient coun-
try’s need for debt relief; basic political conditions in the recipient country; its track record in 
cooperation on debt management; its need for funds for environmental and resource protection, 
poverty-reduction measures, or education measures. 
In the framework of scheduled bilateral debt-restructuring talks (DC consultations/DC negotia-
tions), or in some other appropriate form, the BMZ – following coordination with the Bundes-
ministerium  der Finanzen (BMF) and the Auswärtigen Amt (AA) – presents a debt-swap pro-
posal to a partner country. If the partner country accepts the offer, the BMZ decides, in close 
cooperation with the partner country, what projects would be best suited for use of the local 
funds involved. 
The KfW concludes an agreement with the debtor country (“separate agreement”) laying down 
the particulars of the debt swap, e.g. type of measures and institution responsible or a timetable 
for the implementation of the measures agreed on. The implementation of the measures is also 
monitored. This means that the institution responsible for carrying out the measures concerned is 
required to provide annual reports; if a partner-country governmental or nongovernmental or-
ganization carries out the measures, an independent auditor must be commissioned to prepare a 
final report (BMZ 2005a). The debt swap is then implemented as soon as the partner country has 
put the local currency funds to the uses agreed upon. 
Source: BMZ 2005a 
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However the sum of all debt swaps on which agreement had been reached by the end of 
2005 (EUR 887.61 million) is relatively high. 
It is furthermore important to note that these are only aggregate figures; in some individ-
ual countries debt swaps may play an important role in relation to overall FC-related debt. 
In other words, looked at in terms of their volume, debt swaps can be used to set develop-
ment-policy accents. The debt swaps on which agreement was reached with Jordan  
between 1992 and April 2006 (EUR 213.6 million) accounted for close to 59 % of all  
Jordanian FC claims held by Germany at the end of 2005. The equivalent figure for Peru 
was roughly 45 % (Table 1).6 
The following swaps could still be agreed upon under current bilateral agreements and the 
German modalities for debt swaps: EUR 124.6 million with Indonesia, EUR 2.3 million 
with Peru, and EUR 20.5 million with Jordan. 
However, in the cases of Jordan and Peru the volume of debt in need of conversion  
is greater than the volume available for swaps. If the total volume were taken as a basis, 
Jordan would be eligible for an additional EUR 75 million in debt swaps and some EUR 
123 million would be available for Peru for the same purpose. 
If the whole of the ODA claims held by Germany could be used for debt swaps, the addi-
tional funds available for debt swaps for the cases under consideration here would be:  
some EUR 952 million for Indonesia, EUR 127.6 million for Jordan, and roughly EUR 
171 million for Peru. 
In Indonesia Germany has thus far carried out a debt swap in the education sector. This 
debt swap, with a volume of EUR 25.5 million, was carried out and concluded between 
2003 and 2005 in the field of advanced teacher training; its aim was to improve primary-
school science education. A second debt swap in the education sector, this time designed 
to promote junior secondary schools and involving a volume of EUR 23 million, is cur-
                                                 
6 One limitation on the comparability of these figures is the fact that the terms of current FC-related 
claims do not coincide with the terms of the debt swaps concerned. All the same, comparing the sum of 
the debt swaps agreed on to now with claims stemming from FC loans does provide an indication of the 
relative significance of debt swaps. 
Table 1: FC and FC debt conversion for Indonesia, Jordan, and Peru, in Mio € 
 Indonesia Jordana Peru 
FC-related claims, end of 2005 1150.0 362.0 318.0 
Max. possible swap volume  198.2 234.1 147.0 
Swaps agreed on thus far 73.6 213.6 144.7 
Swaps still possible  124.6 20.5 2.3 
Source: BMZ 
a) In Jordan agreement was reached after 31 March 06 on another debt swap for EUR 30 million. This is why the 
state of implementation given here is 30 April 06. 
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rently in the process of implementation (2005–2007). A third debt swap, with a volume of 
EUR 25 million, in the environmental and forestry sector is still in the planning phase. 
The share of local currency funds to be raised by the Indonesian side has been 50 % for all 
three swaps. However, this share was not determined on a net present values basis, as sti-
pulated in the German modalities paper.7 In view of the fact that the Indonesian govern-
ment was and is particularly interested in reducing the country’s debt level, a net present  
value calculation would probably not have played any major role in the transactions. 
The two first debt swaps were well integrated within Indonesia’s national development 
strategies, in which education is defined as a priority sector. These two debt swaps are of 
major relevance to development because they help the Indonesian government to pursue 
two goals: promotion of primary education and efforts to balance out regional disparities. 
The education sector accounted for only 3.5 % of Indonesia’s overall budget for 2004; by 
2006 this percentage is set to rise to 12 % and to reach 20 % by the year 2009. 
In Jordan Germany has carried out six debt swaps since 1992 – in the water, environ-
mental, and education sectors. The seventh swap is presently being implemented, and 
agreement has been reached on an eighth, although implementation has not yet got under-
way. The total volume of the debt swaps agreed on thus far is just short of EUR 214 mil-
lion. Measured in terms of their volume, Germany is Jordan’s leading provider of debt 
swaps. 
The conversion rates agreed on in Jordan have amounted to 50 %. These rates were not set 
on the basis of a net present value calculation. One reason for this could be that Jordan 
was especially interested in reducing its debt level and therefore did not attach any particu-
lar importance to a calculation of net present value. 
The debt swaps are well embedded in Jordan’s national development strategies, with the 
local currency funds involved being used in sectors (water, education, poverty reduction) 
that have played an important role in both the National Agenda (Government of Jordan 
2005) and the Socio-Economic Transformation Plan (SETP). Debt Swaps VII and VIII – 
education sector – are also integrated into the Education Reform for the Knowledge Econ-
omy program (ERfKE). 
Thus far agreement has been reached with Peru on nine debt swaps, and another is in 
planning. While the conversion rates agreed on with Peru (30–40 %) are higher than those 
used for the Swiss debt swaps conducted there (25 %), the conversion rates agreed on for 
the Italian (total volume: US$ 186 million) and Spanish counterpart funds was 100 % 
(Hochhuth 2006, 12). 
 
                                                 
7 “… The share of local funds to be provided by the debtor country is defined on a case-by-case basis; the 
debt-reduction effect of the debt swap, which is determined on a net present value basis, is taken into 
account here as an orientation variable….” (BMZ 2005a, 1). 
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3 Integration into German and multilateral DC 
The official German modalities paper8 for FC debt conversion is the basis for the formal 
integration of debt swaps into German DC. The paper sets out the administrative proce-
dure for debt swaps as follows: 
i. The German government and the partner country reach agreement on a conversion of 
debt stemming from FC loans; 
ii. the BMZ reaches agreement with the partner country on the projects to be carried out 
and then commissions the KfW with the task of implementation; 
iii. the KfW is in charge of transacting the financial aspects of the debt swap. The so-
called “separate agreement” with the partner government specifies the particulars of 
the measures to be carried out – e.g. sectors, institutions responsible for projects, 
goals, reporting obligations; 
iv. the KfW, with the previous approval of the BMZ, implements the debt swap as soon 
as the partner country has met its contractual obligations. 
Since the partner countries use funds of their own – and not FC funds – for debt swaps, the 
FC / TC guidelines do not apply here; but the partner is nevertheless obliged to have au-
dits conducted by an internationally recognized consultant. The German modalities paper 
further contains the following stipulations on the monitoring of project implementation: 
“… Project implementation must be monitored. In order to keep the related costs as 
low as possible, the funds will be … used in bilateral German or multilateral projects. 
In cases involving support to a governmental or nongovernmental organization of the 
developing country, an independent auditing agency must be called in.”   
(BMZ 2005a) 
The separate agreements as a rule require partners to prepare both annual reports and a 
final report. The KfW monitors the conduct of the audits, and as soon as implementation 
has been completed, it recommends debt cancellation to the BMZ; based on the annual 
reports, the KfW may also recommend cancellation of part of a partner’s debt. 
Compared with the other FC instruments in use, this administrative procedure considera-
bly reduced the intensity of the support activities required of the KfW. While partners are 
required to coordinate their choice of projects with BMZ and KfW, they then have a 
largely free hand when it comes to project implementation. Based on the annual and final 
reports, the KfW examines whether the measures/projects have been carried out in com-
pliance with the separate agreement in question. This low level of support intensity may 
be seen as appropriate in that the partners use funds of their own for the projects, with FC 
funds being used only “indirectly.” However, there is a risk here that project implementa-
tion may prove to be of poorer quality than projects implemented in the framework of the 
FC instruments used by the KfW. 
                                                 
8 For the German modalities paper, see the Annex. 
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One way to assure the quality of projects would be to integrate them into existing DC 
structures (German or those of other bilateral donors). German DC is in possession of 
functioning planning and implementation structures, in particular in the priority areas of 
German DC. Apart from the concrete administrative procedures, debt swaps are covered in 
the BMZ’s country concepts. 
In 2000 the following three priorities were agreed on for Indonesia: economic reform, 
transportation, health. Decentralization is a cross-cutting issue here (BMZ 2005b). The 
first two debt swaps concerned the education sector instead of these priorities. But in view 
of the fact that the projects carried out in connection with Debt Swaps I and II were com-
plementary to the FC / TC cooperation project SEQIP I & II, these projects are well em-
bedded in German structures on the ground. Together with the Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the KfW coordinated the measures proposed for these 
projects (BMZ 2002). 
This means that the debt swaps were granted for a program that had been carried out by 
KfW and GTZ even before the priorities were defined for German DC. This program was 
at a stage in which the partners were able to continue with the projects on their own re-
sponsibility. 
Debt conversion in Indonesia has shown clearly that the structural preconditions, in par-
ticular functioning planning and implementation structures, must be seen as a very impor-
tant criterion for the implementation of debt swaps. This often applies for programs car-
ried out in the framework of the priorities set for German DC. But it would also be con-
ceivable to use debt swaps for programs/projects of other donors. 
Since thus far only one debt swap has been completed in Indonesia, the only reports avail-
able are annual reports. An external final report will be prepared in 2006 on the first debt 
swap. It will examine in particular whether the local currency funds were spent as stipu-
lated. 
The debt swaps carried out in Indonesia were in part well integrated in multilateral devel-
opment strategies. In Indonesia the second German debt swap serves to complement the 
Indonesian government’s project “Improving the Quality of Junior Secondary Education,” 
which involves overall costs amounting to US$ 382 million. The World Bank has contrib-
uted US$ 296 million to this project and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has as-
sumed the role of “partner agency.”9 The school-building activities carried out in connec-
tion with the debt swap complement the activities of the World Bank. The KfW has in this 
way been able to avoid any duplications in procurement and funding. 
Since 2001 the focus of German DC in Jordan has been on the water sector, including 
relevant environmental aspects. German DC focused on the water/wastewater sector in 
Jordan even before this priority was set. Debt Swaps I, II, and V have for this reason been 
embedded in the comprehensive German engagement in the field of wastewater collection 
and treatment. 
                                                 
9 The volume of the funds contributed by the ADB is unknown. 
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Making use of the leeway provided for in this connection, additional FC projects are being 
carried out in the field of primary-school construction. There is thus a direct link between 
Debt Swap IV and the school-construction program, and the swap has been used in the 
framework of the Education Reform for the Knowledge Economy program (ERfKE), 
which also includes other FC school-construction projects carried out by the KfW. 
Even though Debt Swaps III, IV, and VI – the Social Productivity Program – are not di-
rectly associated with the German FC engagement, they – like the latter – do have a pov-
erty-reduction thrust. 
The use of parts of Debt Swap VIII to finance a technical college is not integrated into 
German DC structures. This is one reason why the dialogue with the Jordanian side turned 
out to be relatively difficult. 
The KfW has reviewed the use of the funds on the basis of the annual reports prepared by 
the Jordanian partners on Debt Swaps I-IV. While the separate agreements with the KfW 
require partners to submit external final reports, the KfW has not called for such reports 
either for Debt Swaps I-IV or for Debt Swap VI, the reason being that the partners pro-
vided comprehensive and detailed project documentations in the annexes to their annual 
reports. For Debt Swap V a final report will be prepared and submitted to the BMZ. 
In Jordan Debt Swaps III, IV, and VI are being carried out in the framework of joint proj-
ects involving the KfW, the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Devel-
opment, and the Islamic Bank for Development. The World Bank, the Arab Fund for Eco-
nomic and Social Development, and the Islamic Bank for Development have made credits 
available and the KfW has provided a grant. The Jordanian government has provided its 
own – required – contribution of 20–37.5 % with the aid of the debt swaps. 
Debt Swap VII and the KfW FC projects in the field of primary-school construction are 
integrated into a national education reform project – ERfKE – which is supported by sev-
eral donors (European Investment Bank (EIB), World Bank, Islamic Development Bank). 
The focus here is on provision of physical infrastructure, i.e. on the program’s third com-
ponent. The Jordanian education ministry has assumed responsibility for coordinating the 
activities of the various donors. For example, the Jordanian side has provided its own re-
quired share of the funding for a World Bank school-construction project with the aid of 
the German debt swaps. Here the World Bank is providing 65 % of the funding, with 35 % 
coming from the German debt swap. 
The greater part of the debt swaps carried out in Peru10 are also embedded in German DC 
structures and the German priority areas set for Peru. The projects underway in connection 
with Debt Swaps I and II are being carried out in the context of the FC-TC cooperation 
project on nature conservation areas / PREOFANPE. The KfW has reviewed project pro-
gress in connection with its monitoring of the FC project. The projects carried out in con-
nection with Debt Swap IV are directly linked to the Alto Mayo (alternative development) 
FC-TC cooperation project. An expert funded by the KfW supported the responsible insti-
tutions in formulating the measures provided for. 
                                                 
10 For more information related to what follows on Peru, see Hochhuth (2006, 28–32). 
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The Peruvian institution responsible for Debt Swap V works together with KfW and GTZ. 
The KfW prepared the concept for the project planned for Debt Swap V. The institution 
responsible for the projects has concluded a contract with the GTZ that was funded on the 
basis of funds stemming from the debt swap. In addition, the GTZ intends to carry out a 
TC project with the same institution. 
The measures carried out under Debt Swaps VI and VII to combat youth unemployment 
are not directly linked to KfW projects, but the KfW does regularly review project pro-
gress on the basis of talks with institutions in Lima responsible for FC projects. 
While Debt Swap VIII is not directly linked to KfW or GTZ projects on the ground, the 
counterpart fund is integrated into the DC structures in Peru to the extent that the German 
ambassador and his representative as well as the head of the KfW office in Lima and his 
representative have seats on the CPF executive committee. 
Use of debt swaps – budget-financing: debt-for-budget swaps 
Instead of being used for individual projects, the local currency funds generated from debt 
swaps could also be allocated directly to the budgets of partner countries. Beside basket-
financing, budget support is an instrument of program-oriented joint financing. In the ac-
tual sense of the term, direct allocation of budget-swap funds to a partner country’s budget 
is not budget support. In this case donors do not make funds directly available for a part-
ner country’s budget, the partner uses the local currency funds generated by a budget swap 
to boost his own funding for certain sectors. The following will for this reason use the 
term budget-financing. 
Compared with the use of debt swaps for projects, budget-financing has the following ad-
vantages, which are similar to those described for budget support11: 
• Donor coordination: Here the possibility is given to engage in joint financing with 
other donors, an approach could well lead to more harmonized processes. 
• Increased ownership: Budget-financing further increases ownership because the 
funds involved are no longer tied to specific purposes. 
• Reduction of transaction costs: The approach would significantly lower the KfW’s 
monitoring- and auditing-related transaction costs. Budget aid in the framework of 
debt swaps may be particularly appropriate in cases in which a donor has not devel-
oped sufficient DC structures of his own in a given country. In this case it as a rule 
proves relatively costly to monitor and control projects. 
• Uniform budget framework: A uniform budget framework serves to support partner 
reform programs. 
                                                 
11 For a good overview on budget support and other forms of program-financing as well as on the advan-
tages and drawbacks of these instruments, see Klingebiel / Leiderer / Schmidt (2005) and Koeberle / 
Stavreski (2006). 
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• Financing of current costs: One advantage in the use of debt swaps as budget aid is 
that the funds involved can also be used to cover current costs. One central bottleneck 
in efforts to reach the MDGs must be seen in the lack of possibilities open to partner 
countries to finance their current costs (Wolff 2005). 
• Improved policy dialogue: The approach makes it possible to concentrate better on 
important sectors, since budget-financing is used in sectors defined as priority sectors 
in national Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). On the whole, budget-
financing increases the significance of DC, and this enables DC, in the form of joint 
program-oriented financing, to make important contributions to reaching the MDGs, 
e.g. with the aid of budget-financing. 
However, if these advantages of budget-financing are to be turned to account, the follow-
ing conditions must be met: 
• Functioning budgeting procedures: In order to ensure that the uses to which these 
funds are allocated can be monitored, a country must be able to prepare a verifiable 
budget. 
• Functioning planning and implementation structures: Partners must build ade-
quate structures that enable them to develop, implement, and analyze strategies. 
• Satisfactory public budget management: One central risk is that a partner may not 
report promptly and reliably on the uses to which relevant budget funds are allocated. 
In this case donors are unable to reconstruct how such funds have been used. Good 
budget management is the only way to counter these fiduciary risks.12 
If, instead of being made available for projects, the local currency funds are allocated di-
rectly to a partner’s budget, a donor should examine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the 
requisite conditions have been met in the countries in question. 
Quite apart from the fiduciary risks involved, donors may be forced here to relinquish  
some of their own influence and policy space: In this case the options open to individual 
donors may be restricted because their contribution to a partner budget is relatively small 
on account of the local currency share required in debt swaps. This could reduce the Ger-
man government’s development-related leverage in the countries concerned. 
In Mozambique, France had the local currency funds (EUR 10 million) from a debt swap 
(EUR 30 million) allocated directly to the budget for a certain sector. In selecting a suit-
able sector, France sought orientation in Mozambique’s PRSP. The most important rea-
sons for this approach were that the French DC structure in Mozambique was not suffi-
ciently developed to enable France to monitor the use to which the funds were allocated. 
In addition the sum involved was relatively “small,” which meant that the transaction 
costs for implementation and monitoring would have been inordinately high. 
                                                 
12 See Shand (2006) for a good overview of different types of fiduciary risk in connection with budget 
support. 
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4 Advantages and drawbacks of the German debt-swap instrument 
4.1 Advantages of the German debt-swap instrument 
German debt swaps may, for the following reasons, be seen as a meaningful instrument of 
development policy: 
Reduction of external debt: Since the external debt of partner countries declines nomi-
nally in proportion to the debt swaps agreed upon, the FC debt conversion instrument may 
be said to provide a contribution to reducing the external indebtedness of the beneficiary 
countries. But gauged in terms of the overall debt of partner countries, the role debt swaps 
play differs from country to country.13 
Partner-country debts are cancelled within an agreed-on period of time, and this means 
that the annuities agreed on are cancelled; that is the debt concerned is cancelled neither in 
one sum agreed on in a debt swap nor on completion, by the partner country, of the meas-
ures agreed upon in connection with a debt swap. In other words, for the partner country 
the debt-reduction effect occurs only as the annuities fall due; there is no comprehensive 
and prompt debt-reduction effect. But such debt cancellation does serve to reduce a part-
ner country’s total debt, a factor that played an important role for Jordan in particular.14 
Measured in terms of the following three indicators, in 2004 Indonesia’s external debt 
was relatively high (Table 4): 
• its debt-service ratio amounted to 22 %; 
• its total debt as a percentage of exports amounted to 152 %; and 
• its total debt as a percentage of national income amounted to 56.5 %. 
In 2003 Indonesia’s total external debt amounted to roughly US$ 140.6 billion. While the 
debt relief provided through the three German debt swaps agreed on between 2004 and 
2005, a total of EUR 73.5 million, has contributed to reducing the country’s external debt, 
its quantitative impact has for this reason been relatively low. Since the German debt swap 
in Indonesia was the first one carried out there by a donor, it may have a catalyst effect. 
Other donors could follow the German example in using this instrument. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 The nominal value of the debt swaps implemented by members of the Paris Club between 1991 and 
2005 was US$ 5.6 billion, a relatively small sum when seen in relation to the volume of the debt can-
celled on a multi- and bilateral basis. Since 1983 the members of the Paris Club have cancelled a total of 
some US$ 503 billion in debt (Fayolle 2006; Paris Club 2006a). 
14 For the creditor (Germany) this has the advantage that the loss of revenue involved is distributed across 
the remaining term of the credits. 
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While Jordan’s external debt situation has improved substantially since 1990, in 2004 it 
was – measured in terms of the three following indicators – still relatively high (Table 3): 
• its debt-service ratio amounted to 8.2 %; 
• its total debt as a percentage of exports amounted to 95.5 %; and 
• its total debt as a percentage of national income amounted to 69.8 %. 
The debt swaps transacted in Jordan have contributed substantially to improving the 
country’s debt sustainability. In the period between 1990–2004 Jordan’s total external 
debt fluctuated between US$ 7.3 and 8.3 billion. The debt swaps agreed upon between 
Jordan and all donors since the early 1990s (US$ 800 million) accounted for roughly 10 % 
of the country’s total external debt. 
While Peru’s external debt has also declined substantially since 1994, in 2004 it was – 
measured in terms of the following three indicators – still relatively high (Table 4):  
 
Table 2: The debt situation in Indonesia, 2000–2004 
 Debt service as a % 
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of national income 
2000 22.5 194.5 93.7 
2001 23.6 203.4 88.7 
2002 24.7 193.3 68.1 
2003 25.5 189.6 59.7 
2004 22.1 151.6 56.5 
Source: World Bank 2006b 
Table 3: The debt situation in Jordan, 1990–2004 
 Debt service as a % 
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of national income 
1990 20.4 270.8 219.0 
1995 12.4 158.3 118.8 
2000 12.6 125.4 85.6 
2001 10.6 120.8 82.2 
2002 8.5 116.7 83.8 
2003 15.9 114.3 81.1 
2004 8.2 95.5 69.8 
Source: World Bank 2006b 
Debt Swaps 
German Development Institute  25
• Its debt-service ratio amounted to 17.1 %; 
• its total debt as a percentage of exports amounted to 195.8 %; and 
• its total debt as a percentage of national income amounted to 48.0 %. 
Between 1994 and 2004 Peru’s external debt ranged between US$ 26 and 30 billion. The 
German debt swaps, with a total volume of EUR 147.5 million, therefore accounted for 
less than 1 % of the country’s total external debt. For this reason the German debt swaps 
have not, on their own, significantly improved Peru’s debt situation15 (Hochhuth 2006, 
11–12). 
Simplified procedure: One especially good aspect of the German debt-swap instrument is 
its simplified procedure concerning both the selection and implementation of projects. The 
most important selection criterion is the sector in which the projects are to be imple-
mented. Once German representatives have reached agreement, in the so-called separate 
agreements, with a partner country on the most important features of a debt swap, the 
partner assumes full responsibility for its implementation. 
Additionality: One aim of the German debt-conversion instrument is to generate addi-
tional local funds for poverty reduction as well as for the education and environmental 
sectors. Debt swaps make it possible to implement additional development measures that 
the partner would not have been able to undertake without the funds made available by 
debt cancellation. 
One of the conditions stipulated in the German government’s modalities for FC debt con-
version is additionality. 
                                                 
15 The debt restructured in 1996 in the Paris Club framework (Paris Protocol, 20 July 1996) had a total 
volume of some US$ 6.7 billion, with a German share of roughly DM 440 million (Hochhuth 2006, 11). 
Table 4: The debt situation in Peru, 1995–2004 
 Debt service as a % 
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of exports 
Total debt as a %  
of national income 
1995 15.9 395.5 59.4 
2000 25.6 288.4 55.5 
2001 22.2 278.3 52.4 
2002 32.8 271.8 50.9 
2003 21.3 249.2 50.9 
2004 17.1 195.8 48.0 
Source: World Bank 2006b 
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“Additional measures are carried out in the framework of debt conversion. The addi-
tionality of the described measures in the developing countries is achieved by using 
the local currency funds for new projects. 
Moreover, ongoing measures are eligible if there is no possibility to continue to fund 
them without the use of this instrument, e.g. on account of any current budget-
consolidation processes. The recipient countries are obliged to furnished proof of this 
in suitable form.”  
(BMZ 2005a, 3) 
It is as a rule difficult to monitor additionality since it would have to be clear ex ante what 
projects would have been implemented without the additional funds made available in 
connection with debt conversion (fungibility of money). This requires, first, information 
on a country’s budgeting practices both before and after debt relief has been granted in the 
framework of a debt swap. Second, the projects carried out in connection with a debt swap 
would have to be itemized in the partner country’s budget, i.e. what is needed is a highly 
itemized budget. It is thus, for methodological reasons, generally difficult to demonstrate 
additionality empirically. 
For BMZ and KfW the criterion of additionality is mainly given if the countries concerned 
conduct additional – i.e. new – projects in the framework of a debt swap and if these proj-
ects were not included in their current budget. 
In Indonesia, for example, the funds for the third debt swap are required to be explicitly 
earmarked in the national budget; the swap will partly be dedicated to the forestry sector. 
Increased development leverage: Debt swaps provide the German government with ad-
ditional development leverage in the policy dialogue with recipient countries. In debt 
swaps the sectors in which projects are to be implemented by partners are coordinated 
with the KfW and set down in the separate agreements. This makes it possible to set in-
centives for partner countries to initiate reforms in sectors important in terms of develop-
ment. It at the same time provides a means to move partners to make investments in sensi-
tive sectors, as e.g. in the case of Indonesia. 
The projects involved in the third debt swap in Indonesia are being carried out in a politi-
cally sensitive sector, forestry. And the German debt swap may serve to open the door for 
other projects in the same sector. 
Catalyst effect: A successfully transacted debt swap may also have a catalyst effect on 
other donors. The German debt swap in Indonesia is the first of its kind. No other donor 
has been able to carry out a debt swap in Indonesia, and for this reason the German debt 
swap in Indonesia is being followed with great interests by other donors. If this first swap 
should receive a positive evaluation in a final report, it would be entirely possible that 
other donors might follow Germany’s lead and carry out debts swaps of their own in In-
donesia. 
Conditioned debt relief: Debt conversion involves conditionality and control, though 
these are not so extensive as to overly restrict partners in their own responsibility.  
Increase of ownership: The projects involved are proposed by the partners, and they be-
come components of partner systems by being transacted via national budgets. This fur-
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thermore signals to partners that their structures are recognized. This is one reason why 
the implementation of projects in the framework of debt swaps is relatively simple. 
In Indonesia parents and villagers have been involved in the implementation of the proj-
ects carried out in connection with the first debt swap. The construction measures are 
managed by a school committee consisting of school administration, parents, and the 
community at large. This participation of the people concerned goes some way toward 
increasing ownership.  
Involvement of civil society: Civil society can be involved in the implementation of debt 
swaps. One example here is the counterpart fund in Peru. The fund’s decision-making 
body includes two representatives of Peruvian civil society, who were appointed at the 
proposal of the Peruvian government and with the approval of the German side. Civil so-
ciety was also represented in the founding committee, which prepared a paper on the 
goals, working procedures, and appropriation of the counterpart fund; the paper served as 
an agreement and was signed, in 2002, by the Peruvian government and the KfW (on be-
half of the German government). The start of the fund’s work was, though, delayed for 
roughly six months because the Peruvian government was willing to accept only one of 
the civil society representatives from Mesa de Concertacón. As a second representative, 
the government nominated a person from the conferences of university rectors, who was 
then appointed to the decision-making body. Even though two representatives of civil so-
ciety have seats in the CPF’s decisions-making body, a more exact analysis would be 
needed to be able to assess the actual influence of civil society. Also it is still unclear 
whether the representatives of the conference of rectors in fact act in the interest of civil 
society (Hochhuth 2006, 10). 
Integration into German DC structures: The partner-country projects carried out in the 
framework of a debt swap may be seen as particularly well integrated into the German DC 
structures if these projects are implemented either along with or immediately subsequent 
to German DC programs and/or TC programs. 
Involvement of German business enterprises: German companies are generally eligible 
to become involved in debt swaps. However, in the first place, “tied aid” distorts competi-
tion and second, the volume of these swaps is relatively low, which means that the impact 
of German companies would be limited in any case. In Indonesia two German companies 
(Leipold in Cologne and Klett in Stuttgart) supplied some of the equipment for the schools 
involved, the reason being that comparable Indonesian products were of poorer quality. 
No German companies are involved in the debt swaps in Jordan and Peru (Hochhuth 2006, 
16). 
4.2 Drawbacks of the German debt-swap instrument 
A number of problems that have been encountered are due to the way in which the mo-
dalities for the implementation of German debt swaps are formulated. In particular, eligi-
bility is restricted to the following groups of countries: 
• HIPCs: The 100 % cancellation of FC-related debt in connection with the enhanced 
HIPC Initiative means that these countries are no longer in need of debt conversion. 
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• LDCs: For many countries with LDC status, the KfW provides only grants instead of 
credits. 
• Middle-income countries (MICs): Under the legal provisions currently in force in 
Germany, debt conversion is not a particularly attractive option for highly indebted 
middle-income countries (LMICs and MICs) because the only debts eligible for con-
version are those that have already been restructured with a high degree of condition-
ality in the Paris Club framework. This means that German debt swaps are coupled to 
multilateral debt-relief arrangements. The following conditions apply here: The only 
debts eligible for conversion are restructured FC claims with a number of redemption-
free years (normally 10) and low interest rates, and the recipient country is obliged to 
raise, from its national budget, counterpart funds amounting to 20–50 % of the sum to 
be converted; these local currency funds must be made available promptly and be 
used for new development-related measures.16 In this case a debtor country would ex-
change its traditionally restructured debt for a debt swap that may be costly in the 
short term. 
For these reasons FC debt conversion, in its present form, is becoming less and less rele-
vant as an instrument. Flexibilizing the debt swaps in such a way as to bring it into line 
with the Paris Club rules on debt swaps could be one way to counteract this trend. Since 
under the Paris Club rules all ODA debt is eligible for debt swaps, this would make it pos-
sible to make full use of the scopes which the Paris Club provides for (Paris Club 2005). 
Table 5 lists the countries that would be eligible for debt swaps under the legal provisions 
currently in force in Germany.17 
                                                 
16 LMICs and MICs are as a rule required to commit local currency funds amounting to 40–50 % of the 
debt swap concerned. 
17 The swap commitments made to HIPCs were omitted since these debts have been cancelled. 
Table 5: Still outstanding opportunities for Debt Swaps in Germany, in Mio. € 
Egypt 106.5 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 30.2 
Indonesia 124.6 
Jordan 20.4 
Kyrgyzstan 8.5 
Pakistan 910.0 
Peru 2.3 
Serbia and Montenegro 218.0 
Syria 178.0 
Source: Data provided by the BMZ 
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Table 9 in the Annex shows that it would be possible to enlarge the group of eligible coun-
tries to include the countries that generally have FC-related debt and could prove to be 
interested in making use of a flexibilized debt-swap instrument; these countries would 
include e.g. the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Morocco, Namibia, Peru, the Philippines, Serbia-Montenegro, or Tunisia. 
In addition, debt swaps entail the following risks: Since the debtor country is required to 
make available, in local currency, 20–50 % of the sum in question for national partner 
projects, this means a major burden for the current partner budget. Suspension of the 
interest payments on the sum to be swapped does relieve the partner budget, but, in a gi-
ven budget year, the debt-service payments that would have accrued during the term of the 
debt swap are as a rule lower than the amount of the local currency funds the partner coun-
try is required to raise for a debt swap. In addition, the debt eligible for cancellation in the 
framework of a German debt swap must already have been restructured with the Paris 
Club, and this means that it has a high degree of concessionality. As a rule, debt restruc-
turing of this kind entails an extension providing for 10–15 redemption-free years. At the 
point of time when the debt swap is actually implemented, the debtor country is often in 
this redemption-free phase, in which it is only required to keep up its interest payments. 
This means that the country in question is forced to make advance outlays in local cur-
rency and may have to take out loans in local currency, which may be more costly than FC 
loans. 
The partner country would benefit financially from the debt swap only if the burden on its 
budget due to the local currency requirement were lower than the net present value of the 
debt set to be cancelled. In most cases, neither the Indonesian and Jordanian partners nor 
the German government have conducted net present value calculations, even though the 
German modalities for FC debt conversion specify that the level of the partner local cur-
rency share must be determined on the basis of a calculation of the net present value of the 
debt-reduction effect anticipated for the debt swap.18 
In view of the fact that net present value is a crucial factor for the costs of debt swaps, 
there is some question as to why this value was often not calculated. Net present value 
would not play a crucial role if the budgets of partner countries were not additionally bur-
dened by debt swaps, i.e. if there were no project additionality requirement. This could be 
an indication of a windfall effect, or – compared with a nominal debt that stands to be 
immediately reduced by the debt relief provided in connection with a debt swap – net pre-
sent value may play a subordinate role for a partner country. 
Since the implementation of the German debt swaps, the Indonesian government has not 
run a high budget deficit: Measured in GDP terms, the Indonesian budget deficit ranged 
                                                 
18 “The local currency share to be raised by the partner country will be determined on a case-by-case 
basis; the debt-reduction effect of the debt conversion, calculated on a net present value basis, will be 
used for purposes of orientation” (BMZ 2005a, 1). 
Kathrin Berensmann 
 German Development Institute 30 
between -0.6 and -0.9 % between 2002 and 2005 (Table 6). And for this reason the overall 
Indonesian budget was not overly burdened. 
Jordan’s budget deficit fluctuated substantially between 1993 and 2005. While in 1995 
the Jordanian budget deficit was -0.1 % in GDP terms, the figure for 2005 was -6.4 %, i.e. 
Jordan’s deficit (in GDP terms) was relatively high in 2005.19 Even so, the Jordanian bud-
get was placed under additional strain, and that in a situation involving a high budget defi-
cit, e.g. in the years 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2005. 
Peru’s budget deficit fluctuated between 0.0 % and -3.2 % in GDP terms in this period, 
i.e. it was relatively low. Mobilizing the local currency share seems not to have presented 
a problem for Peru; according to the KfW, thus far all tranches have been disbursed on 
time, and there appear not to have been any delays due to slow mobilization of the local 
currency funds required (Hochhuth 2006, 12). 
Generally speaking, none of the other countries under consideration here faced overly high 
expectations as regards the requirements concerning both counterpart funds and addition-
                                                 
19 It was not possible to calculate the shares of expenditure for the debt swaps in the individual sector bud-
gets because the relevant data were not available. 
Table 6: Development of the budgets of Indonesia, Jordan, and Peru, balance as a % of GDP 
 Indonesia Jordan Peru 
1995   -2.8 
1996  -2.9 -1.0 
1997  -2.6 0.0 
1998  -5.9 -0.5 
1999  -3.5 -3.0 
2000  -4.7 -3.2 
2001  -3.6 -2.3 
2002 -1.5 -4.9 -2.2 
2003 -1.9 -1.0 -1.7 
2004 -1.4 -1.7 -1.1 
2005 -0.6 -6.4 -1.0 
Source: IMF, various country reports 
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ality. As difficult as it is to prove additionality, the principle should be retained in the mo-
dalities in a modified form, e.g. as a stated objective. But the principle should not be un-
derstood to imply that a partner budget must be increased to include the whole of the 
counterpart funds; this should apply only for the individual sectors concerned, e.g. the 
education or environmental sectors or the broader field of poverty reduction. This is why 
additionality is here regarded in the sense of budget reorganization, with the budgets of the 
sectors agreed upon being increased. There is in any case no reason to expect that these 
budgets will be increased in keeping with the amount of the counterpart funds. After all, 
the reason why these countries are granted debt relief in the first place is that they are no 
longer able to keep up their debt-service payments. 
Fiduciary risks and corruption: Since the projects involved in debt swaps are conducted 
by the partner countries themselves, and the German side does not monitor the uses to 
which the funds are put as closely as in the case of other FC instruments used by the KfW, 
the approach entails both a fiduciary risk and the danger of corruption. But neither in In-
donesia nor in Jordan are there any indications that the uses to which the financial re-
sources have been put have not been in line with the agreements concerned. 
Transparency International’s corruption index is an indicator that can be used to assess 
this risk. Jordan ranks 37th on the index and Indonesia comes in place 65. Of the countries 
under consideration, Indonesia does worst on the index, with a ranking of 137 on a list 
including a total of 158 countries (Transparency International 2005). However, the annual 
reports submitted thus far for Indonesia in connection with the German debt swaps con-
tain no indications that the funds involved have not been used in accordance with the 
stipulations made. In 2006 a final report by an independent international auditor is due on 
the first debt swap with Indonesia; one of its tasks is to examine whether the funds have 
been used in keeping with the terms agreed on. 
Nor does the German side have any information indicating that Jordan has used the funds 
provided in connection with the debt swaps for any purposes other than those set out in the 
separate agreements. The KfW has verified correct use on the basis of the annual reports 
prepared by the Jordanian partners on Debt Swaps I-IV.  
High transaction costs in the transition phase: In the transition from projects within FC 
or TC to projects within debt swap projects there is a risk that partners may not yet be able 
to carry out the programs involved without aid from donors. 
Restricted choice of sectors: The projects carried out in the framework of debt swaps are 
restricted to two sectors, education and the environment, or to the broader field of poverty 
reduction. In individual countries this limited number of options may restrict the use of the 
counterpart funds, as e.g. in Jordan. 
Roughly half of the funds used in Jordan for debt swaps were invested in the water sector. 
However, all of the projects funds involved were used for wastewater projects, wastewater 
being part of the one of the sectors stipulated for debt swaps – namely the environment. In 
the water sector it is difficult for the Jordanian side to prove that the projects have been 
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carried out in regions inhabited mainly by poor people. This has made it impossible to 
assign these debt swaps to the field of poverty reduction. Enlarging the sectors eligible 
would make it possible to include priority sectors in the countries concerned. 
No inclusion of commercial claims: Under the Paris Club rules it is possible to use debt 
swaps for commercial claims, a practice engaged in e.g. by the UK, France, Spain, Italy, 
and Switzerland. While German budget law does permit debt swaps for commercial 
claims, such swaps are not approved under the German rules for debt swaps. 
5 Debt swaps for commercial claims  
The Paris Club rules permit debt swaps for commercial claims, a practice engaged in e.g. 
by the UK, France, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland. Under German budget law, debt swaps 
would also be possible for commercial claims. In the UK and France commercial claims 
are sold to investors20, and these transactions must thus be seen as debt-for-equity swaps. 
It would generally be possible for Germany to carry out debt swaps for commercial 
claims in cases in which the countries concerned are priority partner countries or partner 
countries for German DC. The volume of the commercial claims held by the German gov-
ernment against LICs amounts to over EUR 2.9 billion21 (Table 7), and the figure for 
LMICs is EUR 2.6 billion (Table 8). 
                                                 
20 As a rule these are foreign investors from the creditor country or local investors. Foreign investors not 
from the creditor country are also generally eligible to participate. 
21 However, it should be noted here that the debt relief granted to Nigeria in 2005 has not yet been de-
ducted and the German government continues to hold commercial claims on Nigeria amounting to EUR 
Table 7: Claims held by the German government against LICs (German DC partner countries), in Mio. € 
Countrya Claims from FC Commercial claims Total 
India 2,453 182 2,635 
Kenya 137 6 143 
Kyrgyzstan 34 3 37 
Nigeriab 108 1,735 1,843 
Pakistan 1,079 234 1,313 
Tajikistan - 3 3 
Vietnam 153 39 192 
Total 4,321 2,940 7,261 
Source: BMF 2005 
a The table includes only countries against which the German governments holds at least  
 EUR 3 million in commercial claims. 
b In 2005 Nigeria had some of its debt cancelled in the Paris Club framework; this has not been  
 considered in the table. 
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It should be noted, though, that non-ODA debts – e.g. commercial claims – are subject to 
certain limits under the Paris Club rules. These stipulate that 10–30 % of existing com-
mercial claims are eligible for debt swaps, with agreement being reached on the exact per-
centage on a case-by-case basis (Paris Club 2005). 
In general, decisions on whether a country is granted debt swaps for commercial claims 
should be made on a case-by-case basis. This is meant to ensure that countries with low 
debt levels – e.g. China – are not granted such debt swaps. Here there is a need to develop 
criteria, including debt ceilings, good governance, etc. 
Under the Paris Club rules, debt-for-equity swaps may include two different swap types: 
• Direct swap of debt for investor assets: The investor purchases local assets with local 
currency. 
• Indirect swap of debt for investor assets: The creditor sells his local currency to an 
investor (third party), who buys local assets in local currency (Fayolle 2006). 
                                                                                                                                                   
1.7 billion. Furthermore, the BMZ’s country list refers to the year 2004. And in addition, HIPC coun-
tries are not included here. 
Table 8: Claims held by the German government against LMICs (German DC partner countries),  
 in Mio. € 
Countrya Claims from FC Commercial claims Total 
Egypt 2,214 338 2,552 
Algeria 47 588 635 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 57 47 104 
Brazil 70 504 574 
PR China 1,459 104 1,563 
Dominican Republic 35 10 45 
Ecuador 24 26 50 
Guatemala 64 4 68 
Indonesia 1,150 551 1,701 
Jordan 362 28 390 
Colombia 77 22 99 
Morocco 413 19 432 
Macedonia 22 9 31 
Peru 318 26 344 
Philippines 253 8 261 
Syria 281 268 549 
Thailand 166 43 209 
Turkey 1,031 13 1,044 
Total 8,043 2,608 10,651 
Source: BMF 2005 
a The table includes only countries against which the German governments holds at least EUR 3 million  
 in commercial claims. 
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The general aim of debt-for-equity swaps is to reduce total indebtedness and to increase 
capital inflows to debtor countries. In debt-for-equity swaps the creditors acquire debtor 
equity securities. In exchange, the debt concerned is at least reduced in the amount of these 
shares, which means in effect that that the debtor’s debt service is converted into a dividend 
transfer (Bulow / Rogoff 1988; Burda / Wyplosz 1994; Deutsche Bundesbank 1997). 
One important advantage of debt-for-equity swaps is that in this case the government of the 
creditor country offers domestic business enterprises an incentive to invest in developing 
countries. However, in effect this means that these investors are indirectly subsidized. It is 
questionable whether indirect subsidies provided via debt swaps are preferable to direct sub-
sidies. In addition, these debt swaps may entail the risk of a windfall effect in the case that 
the companies involved would in any case have invested in the countries in question. 
5.1 France 
In a French debt-for-equity swap, a debtor country is permitted to buy back the debt it 
owes France before it falls due, and to do so in local currency and at a discount price; here 
the debtor country buys the debt instruments from French/foreign investors who have pur-
chased the instruments from the French government. The investors then use the debt in-
struments for local projects. 
Investment selection is a two-stage process. In the first stage the debtor country’s finance 
ministry informs potential investors of the tender. In the second stage the French finance 
ministry, in cooperation with the French export agency (Compagnie Francaise d’Assurance 
et de Credits d’Exportation – COFACE), selects an investor. The selection criteria are the 
types of project in question and the offer made by the investor in the tendering process. 
The French debt-for-equity swap functions in the following way: 
1. France and the debtor country sign a bilateral agreement setting out the terms of the 
debt swap, including e.g. type of investment (sectors), transferable debts, debt-
buyback rate, criteria for investors, etc. 
2. The debtor country sends an information sheet to the potential investors. 
3. The investors propose projects to the debtor country’s finance ministry, which certi-
fies its authorization for the tendering procedure. 
4. The French finance ministry invites the investors to submit offers for the sale of the 
debt they hold. A bidding procedure is expected to include at least three investors.  
5. At the end of a certain term set for bidding, the French finance ministry analyzes the 
bids that have been accepted. 
6. Once it has analyzed the projects proposed, the French finance ministry publishes a 
list of investors. 
7. The winning investors purchase the debt from COFACE, which operates on behalf of 
the French government. 
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8. Within a period of two weeks, the investors transfer their debt instruments to the 
debtor government, which purchases the debt in local currency and at a price some-
what higher than the transfer price. 
9. The investors use their proceeds from the sale of the debt instruments to raise their 
capital stock or the shares they hold in companies in the debtor country (French 
Treasury 2005). 
The reason why these debt-for-equity swaps entail debt reduction is that the debt-buyback 
rate is lower than the debt’s nominal value. The partner country buys back its debt not at 
its nominal value but at a market discount on which it has reached agreement with the 
French government and which is substantially lower than its nominal value. 
Example22 
A developing country buys back from the investor, in local currency, the debt it owes the 
French government; let us say this debt has a nominal value of EUR 100 million and the 
debtor country buys it back for EUR 56 million. The investor is aware of this buyback 
value and offers, say, EUR 40 million. Assuming that this investor wins in the bidding 
procedure, he will buy the debt from the French government for EUR 40 million. The go-
vernment of the debtor country then gives this investor the equivalent of EUR 56 million 
in local currency. The investor has thus made a gain worth EUR 16 million in local cur-
rency. The investor then makes a capital investment in local currency worth a total of 
EUR 56 million (Figure 6). 
One other advantage this type of debt conversion has for the debtor is that it entails an 
inflow of direct investment which may lead to a transfer of know-how. This serves to in-
crease the – usually low – capital stock of developing countries. In addition, investors are 
unlikely to withdraw their direct investments quickly from a developing country because 
their engagement there is as a rule more long- than short-term. Furthermore, direct in-
vestments reduce external debt since the latter are not regarded as debt instruments. 
Debt-for-equity swaps also have the advantage of reducing investment costs since inves-
tors in this way acquire local currency on favourable terms. The investor’s profit margin is 
based on the differential between the price paid to the French government and the price 
received from the debtor country. 
However, there is a risk of windfall effects for the case that an investor would in any case 
have invested in the partner country. One example that may be cited here is France Tele-
com, which carried out a debt swap of this kind in Jordan. Even though the profit margin 
was no higher than 2–3 %, the swap was still profitable for the French investor because 
France Telecom would likely have invested one way or the other. 
                                                 
22 This is of course a fictive example. 
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5.2 The UK 
The UK has conducted debt-for-equity swaps since 1992. These transactions involve 
swapping a developing country’s public external debt – which has already been restruc-
tured in the Paris Club framework – for debt in local currency.23 
There are three central actors involved here: 
• The UK Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD): This institution offers 
British exporters credits and insurance for their investments abroad. The ECGD pro-
vides British exporters guarantees for their claims for the case that a company in a de-
veloping country defaults on its payments. The government of a developing country 
provides ECGD security for the exporter’s claims against the local company con-
cerned. This means that ECGD then holds a claim not against the company but 
against the government of the developing country involved. 
                                                 
23 The following remarks on modalities involved in British debt-for-equity swaps are based on ECGD 
(2003, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c and 2006d). 
Figure 6: How the French debt-for-equity swap works 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on data from the French Treasury (2004). 
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The reason why a debtor country’s debt is reduced by these debt-for equity swaps is 
that ECDG permits it to repay its debt at a discounted rate. 
• The investor: An investor offers, in hard currency, a certain, discounted price for 
ECGD’s claims against a developing country. In return the investor is given, by the 
government of the country concerned, a certain sum in local currency (the repayment 
rate in local currency) which, while discounted, is still higher than the price the inves-
tor pays to ECGD in hard currency. The investor then invests the differential – in lo-
cal currency – in local projects. 
• The debtor government: The debtor government reaches agreement with the inves-
tor on the repayment rate and the type of investments to be made. 
The British debt-for-equity swap works as follows: 
1. ECGD invites potential investors to tender for claims it holds against a developing 
country. However, these claims must be part of the foreign debt of a developing coun-
try that has already been restructured in the Paris Club framework.  
2. An investor approaches ECGD, stating his interest in acquiring all of part or a claim, 
and then submits a formal application. While both national and international investors 
are eligible to participate in the tendering procedure for a debt swap, the investors as a 
rule stem either from the UK or the developing country concerned. Their applications 
must contain detailed information on tender price and the type of investments planned 
in the developing country concerned. 
3. The first assessment criterion for a tender to ECGD is the price offered. If the latter is 
below the minimum price set by ECGD, the department calls on the investor to sub-
mit a new offer. 
4. In a second step, ECDG then analyzes the tenders it has received, for the most part on 
the basis of the following criteria: tender price, project type, social and economic im-
pacts of the investments proposed in the regions in question, environmental impacts, 
and the know-how of the companies concerned in the investment areas under consid-
eration. 
5. Either prior to or during the application procedure with ECGD, the investor is ex-
pected to have conducted negotiations with the government of the developing country 
concerned over the repayment rate and the types of investment envisaged. 
6. If the both negotiations between the developing country and the investor and ECGD’s 
analysis come to a positive result, the debt swap is concluded. 
Figure 7 depicts the mode of operation of the British debt-for-equity swap. ECGD sells 
claims it holds against a developing country to, say, a British investor. The investor buys 
from ECGD, in hard currency, a share of the sovereign debt in question at a discounted 
price. The investor then swaps his debt instrument with the debtor government for local 
currency and invests in the developing country in question. 
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Example24 
ECGD has provided security for export-related claims of EUR 10 million held by a British 
company against a company in a developing country. The government of a developing 
country has in turn provided a guarantee that it will honor the claims held by ECGD in the 
case that the company of the developing country defaults on its payments. Assuming that 
the company of the developing country fails to pay its debts, ECDG pays EUR 10 million 
to the British company for its claims. ECGD then holds claims of EUR 10 million against 
the government of the developing country. 
ECDG invites tenders for this claim, and a British company offers EUR 5 million for it. In 
parallel, the investor negotiates with the government of the developing country over the 
repayment rate and reaches agreement with it on a sum of dinar 7 million, which will be 
invested in the developing country. ECGD then grants the developing country debt relief 
amounting to EUR 10 million (Figure 7). 
All of the actors involved in this debt swap enjoy a number of benefits. To start out with 
the developing country’s benefits (ECGD 2003, 2006a, and 2006b): 
• Additional investment in the country’s development: The amount the country owes 
– in local currency – is invested in the country’s social and economic development. 
• Attraction of investment: The developing country attracts additional direct invest-
ment, obtaining the benefits outlined above. 
• Debt-reduction effect: The developing country’s debt is reduced because the amount 
it repays to the investor in local currency is lower than the nominal value of the prin-
ciple claim, and this reduces its debt level. 
• No effect on currency reserves: The swap is transacted between debt in foreign, hard 
currency and local currency, and this has no effect on the country’s currency reserves. 
ECGD mainly has the following benefits: 
• Cash: ECGD obtains immediately cash for a long-standing and uncertain claim. 
• Low transaction costs for ECGD: ECGD is not involved in the negotiations be-
tween the potential investor and the developing country concerned. In addition, 
ECDG is not involved in verifying the implementation of the investment concerned. 
The investor’s benefits include: 
• A profit: the purchase price in hard currency is lower than the sum which the devel-
oping country’s government is obliged to repay to the investor in local currency. 
 
                                                 
24 This is of course a fictive example. 
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However, these benefits must be balanced off against a small number of drawbacks. As in 
the case of the French debt swap, this approach involves the risk of a windfall effect, i.e. 
for the case that the British company would have invested one way or the other. In addi-
tion, ECGD loses part of the claims it holds. But all in all, it can be said that the benefits 
of this debt swap outweigh the drawbacks. 
Experience with British debt-for-equity swaps 
Thus far little experience has been gained with these debt-for-equity swaps, the reason 
being that relatively few of them have been implemented since the instrument was adop-
ted.25 Between 1992 and 1997 debt swaps of this kind were carried out in three countries: 
• Egypt: In 1993 US$ 75 million was invested in the Egyptian financial sector. 
• Tanzania: In 1995 some ₤ 15 million was invested in the healthcare sector for the de-
velopment of a lab designed to investigate the impacts of malaria. 
• Mozambique: In 1995 ₤ 25 million was put to use in the agricultural sector to support 
agricultural products. 
A revised version of this type of this instrument was used in Jordan to carry out three debt-
for-equity swaps; these were transacted in the framework of an official British-Jordanian 
                                                 
25 The following information was made available by ECGD. However, in-depth information concerning 
the terms for swaps is treated as confidential; this would include e.g. the level of conversion rates, the 
duration of negotiations, or the number of investor tenders received. 
Figure 7: How the British debt-for-equity swap works 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on ECGD (2003) 
Investor 
ECGD Debtor 
Investment in local pro-
jects: Dinar 7 mio. 
Amount due in 
local currency: 
Dinar 7 mio. 
Payment in  
hard currency:  
US$ 5 mio. 
       Debt reduction: US$ 10 mio.
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debt-conversion agreement finalized in 2001. Under the agreement ECGD is making ₤ 90 
million available for debt swaps (Jordan Times 2001): 
• A British airline has bought a Jordanian airline catering company for ₤ 23 million.  
• A Jordanian company has invested ₤ 4.5 million in an oil-recycling plant. 
• A Jordanian company has built an information and technology center for ₤ 69.5 mil-
lion. 
The UK has proposed one debt swap in Indonesia. But even the preparatory process has 
proven difficult; the British investor and the Indonesian government have thus far been 
unable to reach agreement on the conversion rate. 
While the debt-swap models for commercial claims do, on the whole, offer a number of 
advantages, relatively few such swaps have been transacted in the UK and France. 
5.3 The Swiss Debt Reduction Facility 
The Swiss Debt Reduction Facility is another example of an approach to commercial debt 
conversion.26 The long-term aim of the Swiss debt-reduction program was to restore regu-
lar relations between debtors and creditors, to support the economic and social develop-
ment of the developing countries concerned, and to buy up all existing bilateral claims. 
The program included the following elements: 
• The facility’s was to be used to buy back or cancel publicly guaranteed debt; 
• to participate in internationally coordinated buybacks and debt-cancellation actions 
involving commercial bank claims; 
• to provide contributions to financing arrears owed to multilateral financial institu-
tions; and 
• to promote the use and dissemination of computer-based debt management programs 
designed to make debt management easier and more transparent. 
Since in 1978 Switzerland had cancelled all of the ODA-related debt owed to it, the pro-
gram covered only commercial debt. The facility was used to purchase 95 % of the unin-
sured share of the commercial claims (own-risk shares) held by Swiss exporters and com-
mercial banks for an average of 20 % of its nominal value, a sum amounting to CHF 350 
million. In addition, the guaranteed shares of the Swiss export-risk insurance were trans-
ferred to the facility. This meant that the total volume of funds available for debt conver-
sion was CHF 1.3 billion. 
The Swiss state secretary for economic affairs (Seco) derived the following lessons from 
the debt program: 
                                                 
26 On the following discussion of the Swiss Debt Reduction Facility, see Hochhuth (2006, 14–15). 
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• The conversion rate plays a key role for the development of debt swaps. Switzerland 
demanded a 25 % rate, which meant granting a high degree of concessionality. This 
served to underline the development-related significance of the facility. 
• In the case of MICs the aim of the Swiss Debt Reduction Facility was to reintegrate 
the countries concerned into the world market. However, administration of the facility 
proved to be complicated and cost-intensive. When the facility was being developed, 
it appeared to offer an efficient approach, but in the meantime IMF and World Bank 
have developed systems (e.g. the IDA Debt Buyback Facility, HIPC) that would seem 
to be more efficient. 
• Generally, the facility was to focus on providing debt relief when a country’s debt 
sustainability was at risk. In Seco’s view, counterpart funds should, under the frame-
work conditions given today, be used only under certain circumstances, e.g. if budget 
support proves impracticable. But in most cases Seco at present prefers other instru-
ments when the aim is to (re)integrate developing countries into the world economy; 
these include e.g. promotion of microfinance, SME promotion, budget support (not 
for MICs), private-public partnerships or trade promotion, or participation in interna-
tional initiatives like the IDA Debt Buyback Facility or the HIPC Trust Fund. 
6 Policy recommendations 
The aim of the present study was to analyze the instrument of FC debt conversion (debt 
swaps) and to examine whether there may be a need to reform, i.e. to flexibilize, the in-
strument. Exemplary analyses of the debt swaps carried out in a number of different coun-
tries (Indonesia, Jordan, and Peru) were conduced in this framework. 
The analysis of German FC debt conversion found that the German debt swaps are a 
meaningful instrument of development policy. The study for this reason recommends that 
the instrument be expanded and flexibilized. In view of the fact that the Paris Club rules 
on debt swaps are considerably more flexible than those applied by the German govern-
ment, the study recommends that the German rules should be adapted to the Paris Club 
rules. 
However, debt swaps should not be used indiscriminately; their use should instead be re-
stricted to cases in which a partner’s debt has become unsustainable, it is possible to en-
sure that the funds involved will be used only for purposes meaningful in development 
terms, and the country concerned consents to their use. In view of the problems outlined 
above, the present study comes to the following recommendations: 
In order to minimize the fiduciary risk involved, an internationally recognized auditor 
should, as provided for in any case, audit debt-swap projects on the basis of a final report. 
Annual partner reports are often not a sufficient basis for an assessment of the implemen-
tation of debt swaps, since such reports do not contain an objective analysis. Furthermore, 
in order to ensure that an objective audit is carried out, audits should be conducted not by 
national partner-country audit offices but by an independent auditor. 
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Improved donor coordination could provide better leverage. In Peru, for example, there 
was very little coordination of measures among the donors involved. One goal of the 
Swiss debt-reduction program was to integrate other donors. The aim was to achieve sig-
nificant levels of debt reduction. For this reason Switzerland participated in a number of 
internationally coordinated actions, including e.g. debt-buyback initiatives, which, accord-
ing to the World Bank, could assume new importance in the future (Hochhuth 2006, 18–19). 
Moreover, the enhanced multilateral monitoring and investment instruments now available 
make it possible for donors to coordinate their contributions. In this connection the KfW 
has urged that more policy-based lending should be used in Peru. This would mean linking 
credits to political conditionalities. Such credit lines are provided by the World Bank in 
the framework of its Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) as well as by the IMF in 
the framework of its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). This approach 
makes it possible to provide coordinated and concessional credits conditioned on the im-
plementation of certain adjustment measures (Hochhuth 2006, 20). 
Generally speaking, flexibilizing, and in this way expanding the quantitative outreach of 
the debt-swap instrument would provide German DC with better avenues to involvement 
in and more policy space for its efforts to contribute to reaching the MDGs. In all three of 
the countries under consideration the funds mobilized through debt swaps have for the 
most part contributed directly to reaching individual MDGs, and these funds were in part 
well integrated within multilateral development strategies. However, the contribution pro-
vided by German DC on the basis of debt swaps has been relatively small. In other words, 
while debt-swap projects may support partners in their efforts to reach the MDGs, the 
question is whether this type of project-financing provides better support for reaching the 
MDGs than use of the funds for the FC instruments offered by the KfW. Moreover, creat-
ing linkages between internationally coordinated debt swaps could prove to be a good 
way to provide a significant contribution to reaching the MDGs. 
Debt swaps would be more attractive for some partner countries if German debt swaps 
were handled more flexibly, i.e. if they were brought more into line with the Paris Club 
rules and modified in the following ways: 
• Adaptation to the Paris Club rules: Under the Paris Club rules debt swaps can gen-
erally be made available for all ODA debts. In Germany, by comparison, the only 
countries with eligible debt swaps are those that have already reached debt-
restructuring agreements in the Paris Club framework. 
• Inclusion of commercial claims: Under the Paris Club rules debt swaps can also be 
used for commercial claims. While such debt swaps are also permissible under Ger-
man budget law, they are not approved under the current German rules for debt 
swaps. This means that the use of debt swaps is restricted in Germany. In the UK and 
France, on the other hand, commercial claims are sold to investors (debt-for-equity 
swaps). 
The debt-for-equity swaps used in France and the UK offer a number of advantages: 
1. The developing country concerned has the following advantages: additional invest-
ment in national development, a debt-reduction effect, and attraction of investment. 
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2. The creditor country’s government institution will mainly have the following advan-
tages: immediate availability of cash and low transaction costs. 
3. The investor’s advantages include the following: a profit since the purchase price in 
hard currency is lower than the sum which the developing country repays to the inves-
tor in local currency. 
But there are also some disadvantages that need to be considered here. One problem must 
be seen in the risk of a windfall effect for the case that the companies involved would have 
invested one way or the other. Another relevant aspect is that the government institution of 
the industrialized country concerned relinquishes a share of the claims it holds. Even 
though on the whole this debt-swap type entails more advantages than drawbacks, rela-
tively little use has been made of it. 
• Enlarged scopes to make use of the funds involved: Under the German rules a 
debtor country’s counterpart or local funds can be used only for projects in certain 
sectors, these funds are not allowed to be transferred directly to a partner country’s 
budget. Compared with the use of debt swaps for projects, budget-financing has the 
following advantages, which are similar to those offered by budget support: better 
donor coordination, increased ownership, reduction of transaction costs, uniform 
budget frameworks, financing of current costs, and improvement of policy dialogue. 
However, if these advantages of budget-financing are to be turned to account, the fol-
lowing requisite conditions must be given: functioning budgeting practices, effective 
planning and implementing structures, and satisfactory public budget management. 
This may, though, mean that donors will have to relinquish some of their own influ-
ence and policy space. 
• Expansion of the sectors eligible: Projects conducted in the framework of debt 
swaps are restricted to two sectors – environment, education – as well as to the 
broader field of poverty reduction. In many countries this lack of options may restrict 
the uses to which the counterpart funds may be put, as e.g. in the case of Jordan. 
For debt swaps the following requisite conditions should either be put in place or com-
plied with: 
• Requisite structural conditions: One possible way to ensure project quality is to 
integrate debt swaps into existing DC structures of German or other bi- or multi-
lateral donors. The debt swaps carried out in Indonesia and Jordan have shown that 
certain structural preconditions, in particular functioning planning and implementing 
structures, constitute a very important criterion for the successful implementation of 
debt swaps. This is often the case with programs carried out in the framework of the 
priorities of German DC. However, it would also be conceivable for debt swaps to be 
used for programs/projects of other donors. 
Better integration of debt swaps into national strategies and comprehensive ap-
proaches to poverty-reduction strategies could contribute to the sustainability of the 
projects and programs involved (Hochhuth 2006, 20). 
• Good budget management is a key condition required to ensure that the funds con-
cerned are put to the uses agreed upon. 
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In general terms, there is a need for reform leading to an adaptation of the current German 
rules to the more flexible rules used by the Paris Club. 
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Annex 
 
 
 
 
Debt swap provision of the Paris Club 
“Paris Club agreements may contain a provision which makes it possible for creditors to 
voluntarily undertake debt swaps. These operations may be debt for nature, debt for aid, 
debt for equity swaps or other local currency debt swaps. These swaps often involve the 
sale of the debt by the creditor government to an investor who in turn sells the debt to the 
debtor government in return for shares in a local company or for local currency to be used 
in projects in the country. 
In order to preserve comparability of treatment and solidarity among creditors, the amounts 
of debt swaps that can be conducted are capped at a certain percentage of the stock of the 
claims of each individual creditor. 
The terms under which these operations can take place are contained in the standard terms 
of treatment. To ensure full transparency between creditors, debtors and creditors submit a 
report to the Paris Club Secretariat informing about transactions undertaken.” (Paris Club 
2006b) 
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Table 9: Foreign claims of the BRDi in Mio. € 
Country Claims from FC Claims from trade total 
Afghanistan - 37 37 
Albania 87 2 89 
Algeria 47 588 635 
Antigua + Barbuda - 3 3 
Argentina 50 1,114 1,164 
Armenia 59 - 59 
Azerbaijan 49 - 49 
Bermuda - 50 50 
Bolivia 56 - 56 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 57 47 104 
Botswana - 19 19 
Brazil 70 504 574 
Bulgaria 8 168 176 
Cambodia - 2 2 
Cameroon 344 547 891 
Chile 58 34 92 
Columbia 77 22 99 
Congo 52 87 139 
Costa Rica 8 - 8 
Cote d’Ivoire 305 88 393 
Croatia 33 28 61 
Cuba - 112 112 
Dominican Republic 35 10 45 
DPR Korea (North Korea) - 116 116 
DR of the Congo 136 315 451 
Ecuador 24 26 50 
Egypt 2,214 338 2,552 
El Salvador 115 - 115 
Ethiopia - 1 1 
Gabon 23 192 215 
Georgian Republic 95 - 95 
Ghana 13 3 16 
Greece 7 - 7 
Guatemala 64 4 68 
Guinea - 3 3 
Guinea-Bissau - 1 1 
Honduras 4 - 4 
India 2,453 182 2,635 
Indonesia 1,150 551 1,701 
Iran - 4 4 
Iraq - 1,505 1,505 
Israel 542 1 543 
Jamaica 55 - 55 
Jordan 362 28 390 
Kasakhstan 32 - 32 
Kenya 137 6 143 
Kyrgystan 34 3 37 
Lebanon 1 - 1 
Liberia 142 40 182 
Libya - 1 1 
Lithuania - 1 1 
Malaysia 0,2 37 37 
Morocco 413 19 432 
PR China 1,459 104 1,563 
Republik Korea (South Korea) 13 105 118 
UAE Adschman - 1 1 
UAE Dubai - 4 4 
Yemen - 1 1 
Debt Swaps 
German Development Institute  49
 
Mauretania - 1 1 
Mauritius 5 - 5 
Mazedonien 22 9 31 
Mexico - 82 82 
Moldova 5 2 7 
Mongolia 69 - 69 
Myanmar 433 155 588 
Namibia 88 - 88 
Nicaragua 4 - 4 
Nigeria 108 1,735 1,843 
Pakistan 1,079 234 1,313 
Palastine - 2 2 
Papua-Neuguinea 17 - 17 
Paraguay 32 1 33 
Peru 318 26 344 
Philippines 253 8 261 
Poland - 8 8 
Polynesia (franz.) - 17 17 
Portugal 19 - 19 
Romania 10 - 10 
Russia (ex. UdSSR) -   7,366 7,366 
R.F: Russia - 78 78 
Sambia - 185 185 
Sao Tomé u. Principe - 5 5 
Saudi Arabia - 35 35 
Senegal 109 - 109 
Serbia-Montenegro 225 399 624 
Seychellen 3 - 3 
Sierra Leone - 15 15 
Zimbabwe 295 53 348 
Singapure - 249 249 
Sri Lanka 344 - 344 
Southafrica 70 1 71 
Sudan - 153 153 
Suriname - 3 3 
Swasiland 18 - 18 
Syrien 281 268 549 
Tajikistan - 3 3 
Taiwan - 25 25 
Thailand 166 43 209 
Togo - 24 24 
Tonga 3 - 3 
Czech Republic - 4 4 
Tunesia 224 2 226 
Turkey 1,031 13 1,044 
Uganda - 1 1 
Ukraine - 237 237 
Uruguay 12 - 12 
Uzbekistan 105 - 105 
Venezuela - 38 38 
Vietnam 153 39 192 
Belarus - 1 1 
Central African Republic - 3 3 
Cyprus 0,5 - 0,5 
Total 16,385 18,577 34,962 
Source: BMF 2005 
i Private sector included. 
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